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What are the reasons behind the inferior status of women in Middle Eastern society? i  
Why are they veiled, secluded, mistreated and degraded?  For many Western commentators the 
answer is obvious and singular: Islam.  In this paper I will demonstrate that this easy answer is 
mistaken, and that the cultural denigration of women is best understood as the result of what 
Deniz Kandiyoti has called the "patriarchal bargain." ii I will then trace the historical and cultural 
roots of this invidious bargain, which has been generally understood as an inevitable 
consequence of the evolution of patrilineality in situations of cultural complexity.  However, the 
case of the Egyptian Middle Kingdom, which was patrilineal, culturally complex, but yet very 
friendly to women’s rights, shows that this common understanding is insufficient.  Alongside 
complexity and patrilineality, a belief in female inferiority requires a fateful linkage between 
blood and belonging.  This linkage, I suggest, is correlated with an unstable environment and a 
competitive social formation where power is ephemeral and hard to maintain.  
 
 
The Subordination of Women in the Middle East 
To begin, let me present the evidence for female inferiority in the Middle Eastern context.  
If we define subordination as exclusion from the public sphere, then clearly Middle Eastern 
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women are subordinate to men, since girls are obliged to remain within the walls of their father's 
house, while respectable women must stay hidden in the compounds of their husbands’ family.  
This domestic space is the famous harem, the protected feminine part of the household.  The 
term harem derives from the same Arabic root (h-r-m) as haram, which means sacred, forbidden, 
taboo; the holy areas surrounding Mecca and Medina are haram, as are actions which are ritually 
polluting.  H-r-m is also the root for hurma, honor, which makes sense, since honor in the 
Middle East is closely associated with a man's ability to guard the chastity and privacy of his 
harem.  Traditionally, only the closest of male family members are allowed to enter this private 
zone, and respectable women are obliged to remain within it as much as possible.  Those women 
who do leave the feminine refuge of the harem and enter into the public domain must carry their 
privacy with them, hiding from the gaze of men by veiling themselves in concealing robes, the 
hijab, iii an institution seen by both outsiders and Middle Easterners themselves as a central 
feature of their culture. Men and women alike believe that women who do not or cannot follow 
the rules of self-concealment are licentious. iv  In contrast, while women are private, men are 
public.  All men should participate in muwajaha, an open `meeting of faces', and a man of honor 
is expected to come out of his house every day to circulate in public among his fellows, or else 
risk opprobrium and suspicion. v  
Women's anonymity in the Middle East is such that traditionally-minded husbands do not 
refer to their wives by name, to do so is sacrilegious (haram); rather, they obliquely mention `my 
house' or perhaps, at most, allude to `the mother of my sons;’ similarly, when men draw up the 
family genealogy only male ancestors are mentioned, as if the lineage were reproduced by 
masculine parthenogenesis.  Because of the public obscurity of women it is quite possible for the 
stranger sitting in a rural coffeehouse to imagine that he has arrived in a wholly male society, 
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since women are so little seen or heard, appearing only as enigmatic figures draped shapelessly 
in robes and veils that camouflage their femininity and even their humanity. vi    
As we shall see, modern Islamic commentators have recently argued that the veiling of 
women in public and their seclusion in the household does not in itself demonstrate their cultural 
inferiority.  According to this perspective, women’s relegation to the home only points to a 
complimentary division of roles, with men and women having separate but equal parts to play.  
Ideally this may be so, but general cultural assumptions of female inferiority are revealed 
linguistically and behaviorally. vii Women in the Middle East have long served as the preeminent 
`natural' category for all that is inferior and tainted in humanity. It is significant that in Arabic, 
the word female, `awra, signifies not only `women in general', but means also `blemished', `blind 
in one eye', `defective', and `genitalia'. viii   Similar negative terms and accompanying attitudes 
toward women are to be found equally in Arabic and non-Arabic speaking regions, where 
women are derided by men as unreasonable, emotional, childish, polluting, incompetent and 
immoral - everything men ought not be.  
Typically, across the Middle East women's work is devalued, as is their judgement and 
contribution to the household; they are not likely to have any part in decision-making, nor can 
they accumulate resources that might give them independence.  There is also a strong and 
hierarchical separation of the sexes in every aspect of daily life, so that men eat separately from 
their women, and are given the best of the food. The codes of male superiority are inculcated 
from an early age, with the active support of mothers who believe girl children grow `like rain-
fed barley', without health care or special treatment, while boys, `like irrigated wheat' are a more 
valuable and delicate crop demanding extra care and concern; ix therefore it is the boy who gets 
the toys, the fruits, the candy and extra attention; girls are responsible for cleaning up after their 
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brothers and waiting on her younger siblings.  Money the boy earns, he spends on himself; 
money the girl earns, she gives to her mother.  Very often, boys’ violence against girls is not 
condemned and may even be encouraged.  As Susan Dorsky reports from a village in Yemen: “A 
three year old continues smacking his nine-year old sister with a sharply edged toy gun.  She 
forces a smile as she tries to block the blows.  Their mother, another woman, and several older 
boys and girls are present, but do not intervene or criticize the boy." x Writing about similar acts 
witnessed during her stay with the Swat Pukhtun of Northern Pakistan, Cherry Lindholm 
explains the mother’s blasé attitude structurally:  
“One might think that the mother might, out of a sense of solidarity with her own sex, 
prevent her sons from beating her daughters; however, far from preventing such violence, 
she is more likely to encourage it since, not only does it prepare her daughter for the 
treatment she will receive from her future husband, but also it gives her son practice in 
the handling of his future wife who is, after all, the mother's future daughter-in-law; it is 
in the mother's personal interest that her sons should be able to control their wives 
properly.” xi 
Coincident with the general denigration of feminine intelligence and ability is a further 
commonly held belief that women are dissolute creatures eternally prepared to disgrace their 
husbands because of their potential for sexual promiscuity.  Abdellah Hammoudi's words about 
highland Morocco apply more generally across the region: "Women are constantly vilified and 
ranged among the sinister powers; they are seen as beset by uncontrollable sexual impulses that 
dishonor men in their roles of husband, father, and brother or as guardians of patriarchal 
morality." xii   Or, as a typical proverb puts it: "When a man and a woman are alone, Satan is the 
third."  In fact, fitna, the Arab term for chaos and anarchy, is based precisely in the fear of female 
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promiscuity.  Because of this danger, women must be confined behind the walls of her 
compound, and must be punished for straying.   
Nor does women's morality improve as she grows older.  On the contrary, as Cynthia 
Nelson records, according to Arab folk belief: " A child of the male sex comes to the world with 
sixty jnoun (spirits) in his body; the child of the female sex is born pure; but every year, the boy 
gets purified of a jinn, whereas the girl acquires one; and this is the reason that old women, sixty 
years and with sixty jnoun, are sorcerers more malignant than the devil himself." xiii  The menace 
of women becomes especially powerful once they lose their virginity - it is then that they can be 
transformed into powerful forces of evil, becoming uncontrollably lascivious after their 
introduction to sexuality. xiv  Given this prevailing ideology, it is no coincidence that everywhere 
in the Middle East the birth of a boy is the occasion for noisy congratulations, while a girl is 
greeted with silence or condolences. xv Unsurprisingly, to call a man `effeminate' is a deadly 
insult throughout Middle Eastern culture.  For example, as Sawsan el-Messiri reports, in urban 
Cairo “A husband is expected to be able to support his family. If he does not fulfill this role he is 
described as ‘one who is fed by his wife,’ and often called a ‘female.’” xvi   
In this light, the Muslim ethos of equality and autonomy of all believers seems to hold 
only for men - women are debarred from equality by their supposed natural inferiority.  From the 
male point of view, it is right and proper that women be treated as subordinates, since they are 
conceptualized as innately incapable of logic, stubborn, self-willed, eternally polluted by 
menstruation and child birth, driven by overwhelming emotions, fundamentally immoral and 
sensual.  The popular attitude is captured in the sermon of a contemporary Muslim preacher in a 
Jordanian village, as recorded by the anthropologist Richard Antoun:  
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"Oh ye people, verily women are discord.  And the messenger of God did not point out to 
us anything more disturbing of the peace than women.  And verily the discord among the 
people of Israel was on account of their women.  And verily, this is the cause of dishonor 
and the rending of God's commandments and prohibitions, and the loss of family lines, 
and the ruin of houses, the thing that destroys houses.... The woman on leaving the house 
is accompanied by Satan until she returns to her dwelling." xvii 
Lest we imagine that this is an attitude confined to ignorant villagers and bigoted 
mullahs, compare the rural preacher’s words to those of the founder of the modern Bank of 
Egypt:  
"All revealed laws agree that the woman is weaker than the man, that she is inferior in 
body and comprehension, and that men are superior to women.... Women were created 
for men's earthly pleasures and in order to take care of domestic affairs; God did not 
create them to attempt to defeat the men, nor to give opinions or establish policies.... 
They are emotional and, lacking analytical insight, are given to unbalanced mood shifts, 
from joy to sorrow, from pain to pleasure, from hatred to love." xviii 
Islam and Women: Alternative Views 
The preacher and the banker quoted above confidently believe that Islam forthrightly 
condemns the weakness, emotionality and immorality of women and demands their seclusion in 
the household.  Are they correct?  It would seem so, in the light of well-known sayings of the 
Prophet Muhammad (hadith) such as: "Those who entrust power to a woman will never know 
prosperity." "The dog, the ass, and woman interrupt prayer if they pass in front of the believer.”  
“I do not leave after me any cause of trouble more fatal to man than woman.”  “I took a look at 
paradise, and I noted that the people there were poor people.  I took a look at hell, and I noted 
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there women were the majority.”  xix   Furthermore, the Quran itself includes a number of 
passages that would unambiguously appear to signify female inferiority.  This is most especially 
true of the famous injunction that "Men are in charge of women, because Allah hath made the 
one of them to excel the other, and because they spend their property (for the support of 
women).... As for those (women) from whom ye fear rebellion, admonish them and banish them 
to beds apart, and scourge them." xx   These traditions coincide with legal rulings that gave men 
the right to divorce their wives with ease and to marry up to four women, prescribe harsh 
penalties for female infidelity, limit a woman’s inheritance to half that of her male siblings 
whose testimony in court has twice the weight of hers.   
However, of late revisionist Muslim feminists have deployed textual scholarship to 
challenge taken-for-granted anti-female traditions in Islam. For example, Fatima Mernissi writes 
that the Prophet's favorite wife Aisha rebuked Abu-Hurayra, the source of the tradition that 
women defile prayers, as follows: "You compare us now to asses and dogs. In the name of God, I 
have seen the Prophet saying his prayers while I was there, lying on the bed between him and the 
qibla." xxi  Mernissi goes on to assert that many of the more famous anti-female traditions are 
derived from dubious hadith reciters (especially Abu-Hurayra) whose documented negative 
attitudes toward women led them to falsify or overstate the Prophet’s words.  
Supporters of women's rights also assert that Quranic verses (surahs) that subjugate 
women to men are negated or at least challenged by other surahs that specifically give equal 
blessings to both women and men according to their virtues, without reference to their gender.  
For example, they point to the surah which asserts that  "men who surrender unto Allah, and 
women who surrender, and men who believe and women who believe, and men who obey and 
women who obey.... Allah hath prepared for them forgiveness and a vast reward." xxii  Similarly, 
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the Quran plainly states "wives have rights corresponding to those which husbands have, in 
equitable reciprocity." xxiii  From this evidence, common assumptions about the negative Islamic 
view of women are exaggerated, to say the least. 
Revisionists have also vigorously challenged other aspects of Islam that seem to support 
female inferiority.  For example, they note that the Quranic justification for polygamy was not to 
further male domination over women, but to protect orphans in a society where warfare was 
common. Furthermore, the Quran states explicitly that polygamy is only permitted if a man can 
treat all his wives absolutely equally - a stipulation that many reformers have said is practically 
impossible for any man to meet except if he is a saint.  Therefore, these commentators argue that 
for ordinary persons monogamy is the only morally secure form of Muslim marriage, even 
though polygamy is explicitly permissible. xxiv   They also note that Muhammad was 
monogamous for twenty-five years, unwaveringly remaining faithful to his much older first wife, 
Khadija.  And they note as well that the great majority of his later marriages were political in 
motivation, as he used his wives to cement relationships with other groups and his own allies 
(the first five caliphs were his in-laws).  But perhaps Muhammad's attitude toward polygamy can 
be best seen in his stipulation that the marriage between his favorite daughter Fatima and his 
cousin Ali must be strictly monogamous (though Ali was also famous for his many `temporary 
marriages'). xxv   
In a similar vein, the strong sanctions against adultery, which is punishable by death, are 
offset by the legal demand for eyewitness accounts from four reliable persons - a condition that 
renders any confirmation highly unlikely.  And divorce, while allowed, is execrated by the 
Prophet as the most reprehensible of permissible things.  Muslim feminists also recall 
Muhammad's affection for women in general, and for his favorite wife Aisha in particular.  We 
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are reminded that he chose to die in her room, where he was buried, as were the first three 
Caliphs, an honor that hardly seems congruent with a belief in female inferiority.  As for the 
right to `scourge' exasperating women, feminist commentators note that the Prophet himself 
never beat his wives, but preferred instead to withdraw into solitude when angry, telling his 
followers "only the worst among you" would ever resort to violence against their wives. xxvi   
Revisionists also hold that veiling was originally an extraordinary measure applicable 
solely to the wives of the Prophet; it served to remove them from public scrutiny and 
interference, thereby allowing Muhammad some private life. A similarly casual attitude toward 
female modesty can still be seen in present-day Bedouin societies where veiling is little 
practiced, since it is both useless and unnecessary in an environment where everyone is well 
known, and where a great deal of outdoor work and participation is required from all, male and 
female alike. xxvii   Critics of orthodox misogyny note as well that the women of the early Muslim 
community were not expected to demurely withdraw from public life and activity.  The 
Prophet’s wife Aisha is again cited as an example of a female who participated in public debates, 
accompanied Muslim troops to war, was a respected reciter of tradition, and a powerful political 
leader in her own right. xxviii  Muhammad's first wife Khadija also is often mentioned as an early 
exemplar of an independent woman in Islamic society. She was a successful entrepreneur who 
operated her own trading enterprise with the help of her loyal husband and partner, who was 
much younger than her, and who relied upon her for advice and support. 
 The fact that such proud and autonomous women were less and less to be found as Islam 
expanded is due, some feminist historians and critics argue, not to the precepts of Islam but to 
increasing governmental authoritarianism and the creation of relations of hierarchy during the 
Abbasid era and later. Especially crucial was the widespread taking of concubines by the 
Lindholm  patriarchy 
 10 
conquering Muslim troops, which undercut the authority and autonomy of a man's legitimate 
wives. For these new Muslim elite "acquiring a wife was a much more serious undertaking than 
stocking up on concubines who could be discarded, given away, or even killed without any 
questions asked. A wife had her legal rights to property settlement.  She had `family 
connections.'" xxix  Under these circumstances, slave women were increasingly preferred as 
consorts, while their independent freeborn sisters were relegated to seclusion and marginality.  
Present-day Middle Eastern attitudes toward women, revisionist critics say, reflect the later 
imperial history of enslavement and denigration, which removed independent women from the 
public sphere.  These attitudes are in contradiction to the original teachings and practices of 
Islam that gave women far more personal autonomy than is now on offer. 
Moreover, even as women lost much of their independence and authority when the 
Islamic world entered its imperial stage, there remained many legal guarantees in Islamic law 
that served to protect their rights.  For instance, the family law ordained in the Quran and 
promulgated in Islamic jurisprudence directly challenged male dominance and affirmed the 
humanity of women.  Of special significance in this regard was the strong Islamic repudiation the 
old practice of female infanticide, which Muhammad resolutely opposed.  Even more important, 
Islam vastly altered the pre-Islamic legal status of women.  Where previously they had been 
regarded as chattel of their husbands or fathers to be inherited and disposed of at will, they now 
became shareholders in the decedent's estate, with their own individual rights of inheritance 
which could not be alienated by their brothers or husbands.   
Other aspects of Islamic law that would seem to be anti-female, which I mentioned 
above, are offset by compensatory guarantees that make them more egalitarian than they appear 
when viewed in isolation.  For example, the rule that a woman is entitled to only half of the 
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amount inherited by her male relatives was more than balanced by the dowry of goods, money 
and sometimes land that a girl was legally entitled to receive from her family when she married.  
This dowry, augmented by a substantial brideprice (mahar) from her husband's household, 
legally became her own private property, to spend and use as she pleased - though both were 
usually integrated into the common household resource base.  But at divorce, a woman could 
reclaim her brideprice and dowry from her husband, and Islamic courts would be obliged to find 
in her favor. 
Women’s absolute rights to property derived in part from the way marriage has been 
conceptualized in Islamic law.  As distinct from the sacramentalized marriage of Christianity, 
Muslim marriage was viewed as a witnessed contract, transacted, bargained over, signed, sealed, 
and in principle reversible, in which the woman (or her guardian) exchanges her sexuality and 
reproductive capacities in exchange for a negotiated bride price and for permanent protection and 
maintenance. xxx  If terms were not met, the contract could be legally annulled and the mahar 
returned to its rightful owner, the spurned or estranged wife.  In principle, this arrangement 
allowed a woman considerable negotiating leverage in divorce cases, despite the husband's legal 
authority over her. xxxi 
As Noel Coulson has persuasively argued, the advent of Islamic law changed the status of 
the woman "from the position of sale-object to that of contracting party.... endowed with a legal 
competence she did not possess before." xxxii  In effect, far from demanding subordination, 
Islamic jurisprudence made wives legally independent persons for the first time in Western 
history.  This is contrast to the status of women in European Christian society, where until very 
recently the wife's property was permanently joined to that of the husband and where the 
conjugal unit took precedence over the individuals who made it up – if effect making the wife a 
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legal appendage of her husband.  In contrast, Muslim family law denied the primacy of the 
conjugal unit under male authority "in favour of equality of rights on the part of all concerned." 
xxxiii The wife's jural and personal independence was graphically symbolized in her retention of 
her own family name after marriage, and expressed concretely in her legal capacity to earn her 
own money and run her own financial affairs. Of course, this is not to say that women always 
took advantage of their options - most followed custom, effaced themselves, and left their affairs 
to men. 
But if Islamic law did give women new rights and privileges it also took away some 
existing freedoms.  For example, as noted above, the Quran allowed men to divorce their wives 
with ease, but prevented women from doing the same.  This was a change from pre-Islamic 
practice, where Bedouin women apparently had a wide freedom to change mates.  In Islam, 
fornication (zina) was redefined to include old patterns of temporary, female-initiated sexual 
relationships or wife `leasing;’ these now became capital crimes.  And while Islam permitted 
polygamy, it prohibited polyandry.   
Islam thus has a mixed record in its legal attitude toward women - simultaneously giving 
them new powers while abrogating old ones; treating them as objects at one point, as equal and 
autonomous individuals at another. xxxiv  This ambiguity can be seen in the complex and 
sometimes contradictory manner in which legal schools addressed family and sexual issues. xxxv 
The Hanafi legal school, for example, permits women to stipulate terms in a marriage contract.  
These terms can include provisions against polygamy or male control over resources.  
Elsewhere, the Malikite school, while not allowing such negotiation, gives women much greater 
freedom in obtaining divorce than other schools. xxxvi  But in spite of the inequities that are legally 
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enjoined, on balance it is clear that the Quran, sunna, and hadith largely affirm the value of 
women.  As the feminist social historian Leila Ahmed concludes:  
"(T)he unmistakable presence of an ethical egalitarianism (in Islamic texts) explains why 
Muslim women frequently insist, often inexplicably to non-Muslims, that Islam is not 
sexist.  They hear and read in its sacred text, justly and legitimately, a different message 
from that heard by the makers and enforcers of orthodox, androcentric Islam.... For the 
lay Muslim it is not this legalistic voice but rather the ethical egalitarian voice of Islam 
that speaks to them clearly and insistently.  Only within the politically powerful version 
of Islam... is women's position immutably fixed as subordinate." xxxvii 
Feminists are not the only ones who have tried to reconcile the fundamentally egalitarian 
principles of Islam with the facts of sexual inequality.  As I mentioned earlier, instead of 
stressing innate female inferiority and immorality, some revisionist Muslim clerics and leaders 
now argue for the "immutable and complete difference in the nature of the sexes, which is part of 
the God's plan for the world." xxxviii  Within this divine plan, according to the former Libyan ruler 
Muhamar Qaddafi,  "woman and man are equal as human beings... there is a role for each of 
them, matching the difference between them....  She becomes directly responsible for another 
person whom she helps to carry out his biological functions, without which it would die.  The 
man, on the other hand, neither conceives nor breast-feeds." xxxix  The Islamist ideologue Sayyid 
Qutb has made a parallel claim.  Using Quranic texts supplemented with medical evidence, he 
insists that women have endocrinal and nervous systems that naturally suit them to be 
homemakers, and proclaims that "the whole Islamic social system... is an extended family 
system, pertaining to a divine order and set up in conformity with human instincts, needs and 
requirements." xl  Conservative religious reformers are not the only ones to make a quasi-
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biological argument for the complementarity of the sexes.  For example, the academic Nafissa 
El-Amin writes that Muslim family life and law are based on notion that men and women are 
"equal in humanity and complementary in function." xli  A man should properly be viewed as a 
servant to his homemaker wife, repaying her for her essential domestic labors by providing 
money and protection. 
In this new discourse distinction is justified on `natural' grounds by reference to 
evolutionary biology, which is said to prove scientifically that the sexes are naturally in relations 
of functional complementarily. xlii  From this perspective, a correctly organized Muslim society 
will allow women to fulfill their normal, instinctive and noble role as reproducers, child raisers, 
and preservers of the family while men will act their appropriate parts as protectors and wage 
earners.  This modern view grants women a nominal equal status with men so long as the 
balanced and supposedly innate relationship of complementarity between the two sexes is 
maintained.  Any shift in the balance is reckoned to be a deviation from God's blueprint and from 
the natural order; it can only lead to animalistic lust, misery and social collapse; a sad state of 
affairs which, many Muslims say, already obtains in the West. 
In replying to charges of sexual inequity by proclaiming a genetically programmed male-
female complementarily ordained by God, the new commentators are on shaky ground in terms 
of science, theology and logic, since it is hard to see how such a divinely ordained `natural' 
complementarily should require such assiduous buttressing.  However, this new orientation does 
make a great deal of cultural sense, since it validates the existing division of labor and 
reconfigures the ideology of equality by presenting women as equal to men so long as each sex 
remains within its own spheres.  Women now once again have the possibility of being heroines, 
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not by leading armies as Aisha did, but by cleaning the dishes and diapering the baby, as is right 
and natural.  
 
The History and Culture of Misogyny 
Yet despite its justification of female domesticity, the reformist Islamic rhetoric of 
complementarity has not had any more success than the feminist reinterpretation of Islamic texts 
in persuading Middle Eastern men to give more respect to women.   Instead, women are 
increasingly obliged to work outside the home to supplement family income, while also 
continuing to work at their traditional household tasks, without either any help from their male 
partners (helping would contradict the natural order of things) or any credit (women's work is 
unimportant and foolish).  This is the case in both urban and rural environments, as many studies 
attest. xliii   In other words, despite the discourse of complementarily issuing from some reformist 
Muslims, and despite the feminist revisions of orthodoxy, women's lives and work very often 
continue to be demeaned by Middle Eastern men. The evidence of Islamic texts and 
jurisprudence demonstrates that it is not the message of the Islam, which is generally positive 
about women, that is at the core of Middle Eastern misogyny. To understand the roots of the 
androcentric attitudes of the Middle East we need to take into account historical and cultural 
factors that preexisted Islam. 
As a number of historians have noted, the Middle East has long been home to patriarchal 
cultures. For these writers it is the long-prevailing patriarchal culture, not Islam, which is the 
culprit in establishing and sustaining a male-centered universe throughout the Middle East - and 
elsewhere in the circum-Mediterranean world, extending into Northern India and Central Asia. 
xliv   Veiling, for example, has an ancient past, and continues to exist even among Christians, Jews 
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and Hindus of the region. Assyrian tablets dating from the thirteenth century BC prescribe 
veiling for respectable women, while conversely prostitutes and slaves were forbidden to hide 
themselves.  In these instances the veil was used not simply as an indicator of modesty, but also 
as a means to differentiate between rich and poor, free and slave, public and private. xlv   In this 
light, one could even say Islam's basic egalitarianism is verified by the fact that, in contrast to the 
invidious rules of the Assyrians, there is no law in Islam against veiling: rather, among Muslims 
any woman can don the veil, regardless of her social status.  
In her excellent account of the history of women's rights in the Middle East, Leila Ahmed 
shows that most of the pre-Islamic Middle Eastern empires generally gave women few powers.  
Females were excluded from the prestigious professions and from public office; divorce was 
usually difficult for wives, much easier for men, and women were expected to be complaisant 
and obedient to their husbands, who had the right of corporal punishment over their wives, 
children and slaves - a right which continued into Roman law, where a man had the legal right to 
kill his wife and children. For instance, a Mesopotamian law code from 3,000 BC says that a 
woman who contradicts her husband should have her teeth knocked out, while an adulteress 
could be put to death.  Although women had handicaps in the most ancient Middle Eastern states, 
their position gradually went from bad to worse, culminating in the Empire of the Sassanids, 
whose huge harems and anti-female laws set a new low standard for the treatment of women.  
Sassanid women were not allowed to serve as witnesses, could be loaned out as concubines at 
the will of their husbands, and were generally uneducated, housebound, strictly segregated from 
men, and were without financial resources.  The Byzantines were not far behind their Persian 
enemies in this regard, though there is evidence that some of their women, like later 
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entrepreneurial Muslim wives, did have access to independent capital and could participate in 
trade and finance.  xlvi 
Commentators have not come to any final conclusions about the cause of the steady 
expansion of male power and the corresponding diminution of women’s status in the pre-Islamic 
Middle East and its environs save to say that these shifts seem to coincide with the rise of great 
centralized kingdoms, which required an increased division of labor, greater state power, and the 
expansion of status hierarchies. It has been argued that this centralizing process necessarily 
entails greater male dominance, as patrilineal inheritance is initiated to control male rights to 
ever-more valuable permanent property invested in corporate households, while patriarchal 
power expands male authority over women who could potentially disrupt the solidarity of the 
extended lineage by their independence. Deniz Kandiyoti believes the evolution of patriarchy is 
"bound up in the incorporation and control of the family by the state, and in the transition from 
kin-based to tributary modes of surplus control." xlvii  Others say this transformation is the 
culmination of earlier changes, dating from the Neolithic substitution of sedentary agriculture for 
mobile hunting and gathering, which led in turn to more surplus accumulation, greater distinction 
between male and female labor, the rise of male elites, and the development of female seclusion 
as a way of asserting male status distinctions and defending women from abduction and rape. xlviii  
Here too subordination of women is tied to shifts in production and social organization, which is 
correlated with the rise of patrilineal and patrilocal ideology that eventually enslaves women to 
their fathers and husbands, despite their efforts to gain power and status within the system. 
 These quasi-Marxist arguments about shifts in the modes and relations of production are 
sometimes linked to a more ideological claim, derived from the work of W. Robertson-Smith and 
Montgomery Watt, that the central Middle East once was the heartland of an ancient pre-Islamic 
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matriarchal (and presumably kinder and gentler) culture, which was later transformed into a 
patriarchal system that oppressed the women who had once served as rulers.  It is worth 
reiterating that no matriarchy has ever been found to exist anywhere, though women can have 
more or less public power in different cultural milieus - with the present-day Middle East at the 
low end of the spectrum.  xlix What does exist cross-culturally are matrilineal and matrilocal 
social organizations. According to George Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas such systems (and 
their variations) are five times less likely to occur than patrilineal/patrilocal systems.  This is 
usually explained as a consequence of internal contradictions: a matrilineal/matrilocal clan must 
rely for its defense on men who marry in whose loyalty is likely to be to their natal clan; 
meanwhile male members of the clan marry out and also suffer from divided loyalties. l  
Generally in matrilineal and matrilocal systems women's status is quite high, marriage is fragile, 
and women have a high degree of autonomy in comparison to societies, such as those of the 
Middle East, which are overwhelmingly patrilineal and patrilocal.  (Note that there are many 
divergences from the ideal type, such as avunculocal and virilocal residence, or movement 
between matrilineages.  In these instances, women’s power and status is likely to be lessened).  
As David Aberle has shown, matriliny is characteristic of small-scale societies that rely on 
horticulture or fishing for subsistence.  Robin Fox argues this is because movable property is 
meager in such societies while resources are plentiful, so that female inheritance does not mean 
much; in contrast, matriliny is rare among nomads or in areas with plough cultivation or large-
scale agriculture where moveable property is far more valuable and necessary resources are in 
scarce supply.  li If Fox is right, then it is unlikely that the Middle East was ever characterized by 
matriliny, since it has always had a large nomadic component.  It is also where the plough was 
invented and where large-scale agriculture first evolved. 
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Some linguistic and historical evidence for ancient matriliny in the Middle East does 
exist, but it is equivocal.  It is certainly true that more varieties of marriage were permitted in 
Arabia prior to Islam, and that some men did live with the families of their wives, giving their 
lineages a matrilocal and matrilineal appearance; it is also the case that some Bedouin tribes still 
trace their origins back to female founders.  But neither of these facts is real evidence of an 
ancient female-centered social organization.  Rather, tracing one's lineage to a female ancestor 
can be easily understood as the result of polygamy, so that descendants of the founder 
differentiate themselves on the grounds of their respective great grandmothers, whose sons 
would begin and continue as rivals over their common patrimony.  This pattern continues to 
occur today among the Bedouin and elsewhere. 
The evidence of men living with their wives' clans and being adopted by them that are 
found in accounts of early Arabian tribal marriage reflect the leeway possible in the kinship 
organization of pre-Islamic families, but not a coherent matrilineal system. Instead, these are 
most probably special cases, perhaps a consequence of the `lease' marriages or `group' marriages, 
cited by al-Bukhari as common in pre-Islamic Arabia, lii in which the mother of a child could 
have some freedom to choose the man she wished to designate as her child's father.  The man 
chosen might then move in with her to protect his investment against other possible claimants. 
Or, even more likely, these cases may have been a consequence of the tensions of polygamy, as 
the sons of a less favored wife left their father's household, where they were unwelcome, to be 
taken into the tents of the more sympathetic members of their mother's family - a pattern which 
still is quite common in the Middle Eastern world. 
If the postulate of a pre-Islamic matrilineal organization is shaky, so is the idea that 
patriarchal attitudes inevitably arise as a direct consequence of greater social complexity and 
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changes in the relations of production.  For instance, it is not at all evident that farmers are more 
misogynistic than their mobile hunter-gather predecessors.  Some hunter-gatherers sharply 
discriminate between prestigious men's hunting that brings in valued meat, as against despised 
women's gathering that brings in ordinary produce of the fields.  It does not matter that the work 
of women provides the mainstay of the diet - it is the dominant cultural attitude that counts, and 
women's work, and women themselves, can be devalued and held in contempt despite their all-
important productive input.  But although hunters and gatherers can be as androcentric as anyone 
else, in their mode of production women's outdoor work remains absolutely necessary, which 
means that female seclusion cannot occur; it also means that women may have considerable 
autonomy in controlling their own sphere of work. 
An example of this can be seen among desert-dwelling Middle Eastern pastoralists, 
where the necessities of nomadic life require women to work unveiled and to enjoy quite 
substantial freedom in decision making, since they have to take responsibility for the household 
when their husbands are absent, as is often the case (note that in Africa and elsewhere the 
frequent absence of men often correlates with matriliny).  As Lois Beck documents among the 
Qashqai of Iran, women’s’ “work is respected and regarded as vital to the economic unit; no 
household can exist without her labor."  liii   So, as among hunters and gatherers, the ecology and 
mode of production of the desert nomad oblige women to be very much more independent than 
their urban cousins. But this freedom does not necessarily alter the strongly patriarchal morality 
of the tribesmen.  Tribal women are, in reality, much less likely than urban Muslim women to be 
granted any inheritance whatsoever, and they are far more likely to suffer corporal punishment 
for adultery or other delicts, despite the legal protection offered by the Quran. Obviously, then, a 
simple and co-operative mode of production alters the parameters of patriarchy, but does not 
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necessarily preclude it.   And, as Erika Friedl notes, even where tribal women do appear to have 
considerable freedom and authority, in the Middle East these are “only a function of 
socioeconomic circumstances and not embedded in a gender-egalitarian (not to speak of 
gynocentric) ideology."  liv  In such a context, women’s liberty and status are easily abrogated. 
 
The Roots of Patrilineal Misogyny  
The taken-for-granted correlation between patriliny, complexity and female 
subordination is based on the belief that men in a complex society must take measures to be 
certain the son who will inherit from them is actually their own flesh and blood.  To insure this 
they develop a patrilineal ideology and strictly control their wives' freedom and sexuality, and 
simultaneously gradually degrade women as individuals and as a social category.  But while 
male dominance and the denigration of women is indeed often characteristic of complex 
patrilineal/patrilocal social formations, it is not at all inevitable. My contention is that another 
element is required: a deep-seated faith that blood inheritance is the crucial factor in determining 
jural and personal identity. Contemporary Middle Easterners, and modern Westerners as well, 
may consider this belief to be a reflection of the `natural' state of being in which ‘real’ offspring 
are the fruit of sexual intercourse between a man and his wife.   
But the notion that children must be of the same blood as their parents (and particularly 
the same blood as their father) is actually cultural, not natural or inevitable.  In fact, it is perfectly 
possible for a strictly patrilineal/patrilocal society to designate children as legitimate by virtue of 
adoption or simply because they were born to one's wife.  For example, in sub-Saharan Africa 
‘ghost marriages’ allow a childless woman whose husband has died to take lovers and bear their 
children, who are then considered members of her deceased husband’s patriline.  The same 
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principle operates in woman-woman marriage where a postmenopausal or sterile widow can 
marry other women and become the `father' of the children sired by the male lovers of her 
`wives’.  As in ghost marriage, these children belong to the widow’s husband’s patriline.  lv 
However these African cases occur in very simple and societies that lack central leadership, 
intensive agriculture, and state systems.  To really make my point I require an example from a 
complex social formation, preferably one from the Middle East.   
Egypt during the Middle and New Kingdom provides is just such a case. lvi   It was the 
archetypical hierarchical and complex society. It featured intensive agricultural production based 
on the Nile’s annual cycle of flooding.  As Fox’s theory predicts, it was also patrilineal and 
patrilocal.  Yet treatment of the sexes was remarkably even-handed in this vast archaic empire. 
Women could own property, inherit, act as legal individuals, make provisions in marriage 
contracts, initiate divorce, and so on.  Marriage, save for that of the Pharaoh, was monogamous.  
There was no veiling or female seclusion, and women were treated in general with respect and 
dignity, despite male dominance in the political, professional and religious spheres. Furthermore, 
save in the family of the Pharaoh, lvii there was no great concern for insuring the actual paternity 
of a child.  As a result, children were often exchanged, and those without sons commonly 
adopted an heir from outside the family - something unknown in present-day Middle Eastern 
culture. So, while Egypt certainly had a patrilineal and patrilocal kinship organization, actual 
blood relationship was not crucial; of primary importance were the father’s jural rights over the 
child.  In ancient Egypt, the pater takes precedence over the genitor. 
I believe that the ancient Egyptian disinterest in blood purity and the relative equality of 
the sexes among them correlates with other characteristics differentiating their world from the 
rest of the Middle East. Egypt arose within the uniquely protected and rich valley of the Nile, 
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where regular flooding permitted tremendous and stable agricultural production.  Outside the 
valley, ecological conditions did not favor the growth of powerful nomadic groups, and threats 
from desert tribes were relatively easily handled, though there was always danger from the 
warrior people of the Upper Nile.  The culture that grew up in the Nile valley was, generally 
speaking, static, homogenous and secure, with a deep sense of its own ethnic superiority, 
continuity, and longevity.  Egyptian society was also strongly hierarchical, and the Pharaoh was 
revered as a “divine essence, a God incarnate... His coronation was not an apotheosis but an 
epiphany." lviii   Death itself was alien to the Pharaoh: in his tomb he was supposed to live forever, 
ruling in an unchanging universe that was a reflection of the eternal Egyptian cosmos.   
The major rival to Egypt was Mesopotamia, where the Sumerian Empire evolved.  In 
contrast to the bounded, secure and regular world of Egypt, this region was much more like the 
rest of the Middle East, in that it "lacks clear boundaries and was periodically robbed and 
disrupted by the mountaineers on its east or the nomads on its west.... Mesopotamia is, for much 
of its grazing, dependent on uncertain rainfall and possesses in the Tigris an unaccountable, 
turbulent, and most dangerous river." lix. In these difficult circumstances, a sort of ruler far 
removed from the omnipotent Pharaoh appeared, as portrayed in the first written epic, The Epic 
of Gilgamesh.  Unlike the divine Egyptian Pharaohs, Gilgamesh is a human being; he cannot 
conquer death. His sole motivation is gaining personal glory and honor in his lifetime: "I will 
face fighting such as I have never known, I will set out on a road I have never traveled! .... I will 
establish fame for eternity!" lx Gilgamesh’s authority is limited.  To achieve his goals, he must 
rely on the support of his fellow townsmen, and he must constantly demonstrate to them his 
worthiness to lead. He is the product of an unstable and sparse environment favoring continual 
struggles for ephemeral positions of power among co-equal rivals.  Far more than the divine 
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Pharaoh, Gilgamesh is the predecessor of the insecure dynasties that would rule in the Middle 
East thereafter.  
While the Sumerians and later groups struggled for glory and power, in the lush, isolated 
and relatively secure environment of the Nile Valley, under the absolute command of a sacred 
Pharaoh and his priesthood, ordinary men and women were encapsulated in a social universe that 
seemed stable and everlasting.   Pharaohs, anxious to insure the divinity of their sons, were 
obsessed with blood paternity – even to the point of engaging in sibling incest.  But the vast 
majority of Egyptians, protected within the sacred hierarchy, required no belief in `natural' 
inheritance through blood to buttress the solidity of their lineages or to secure their futures.  
Therefore, despite their patrilineal system, ancient Egyptians who were not members of the 
Pharaoh's family had little interest in the preservation of their bloodlines and were not at all 
preoccupied with controlling reproduction by enforcing female seclusion or inferiority.  As we 
have seen, for them, a high degree of female equality and the adoption of heirs were normative.  
Meanwhile, the dual ideologies of patrilineal blood and patriarchal attitudes prevailed among 
Egypt’s combative (and ultimately triumphant) neighbors.   It was the latter model, suited to a far 
more volatile ecological and social setting, which would henceforth prevail in both ancient and 
modern Middle Eastern culture.   
The centrality of this ancient and pervasive ideology of blood is evident when we survey 
contemporary customs in the Middle East. For example, despite Quranic injunctions, in general 
only patrilateral blood kin have the right to inherit land, herds, and other property. Often, only 
clansmen can purchase land owned by clan members. The biological equivalence of patrilineal 
clan members is made explicit in feuds, wherein the blood of any member can serve as payment 
for injuries done by any other, and each has an obligation to take blood revenge for dishonor 
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done to any other kinsman. lxi  The crucial importance of blood is equally obvious in attitudes 
toward those whose blood is suspect. For example, clansmen descended from slaves or other 
dependents might be incorporated into the lineage as clients, helpers and even as fictive kin, but 
they would be the first to be excluded from the group during periods of hardship.  In parallel 
fashion, adoption of children from outside the extended family was and remains extremely rare 
in the Middle East. lxii  
This negative attitude toward outsiders not of one’s own blood persists despite the fact 
that, as the posthumous son of his father, Muhammad had seen for himself the cruelty of a 
patrilineal society toward those who are without a protective family, so that a major emphasis in 
his teaching was on the obligation of Muslims to protect the weak, and especially to care for 
orphans.  Without sons himself, he adopted into his family a number of adult outsiders, including 
the Persian Salman Farisi, the freed Syrian slave Zayid al-Harithi, and the African slave Bilal. 
These were among his first and most loyal converts, joining the alternative community of 
believers that was meant to replace the old patrilineal clan structure.  Yet none of these could 
inherit his mantle. lxiii   On this topic, Islamic law and popular practice are in complete contrast to 
ancient Egyptian codes, which gave adopted children full legal rights of inheritance.   In contrast, 
the children of slave concubines, who did not have legal rights in ancient Egypt, have a full share 
in the patrimony under Muslim law, since they are reckoned to share the blood of their father.  
Because those descended from a common forefather are believed to partake of a shared 
common essence derived from their ancestral blood, the glory of any member reflects on all 
others now and forever; at the same time adultery committed by any clanswoman blemishes all 
her patriline for eternity – unless purged by honor killing.  It is significant that such a killing is 
almost always the responsibility of a woman's siblings, not her husband, since it is her patriline, 
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not his, that has been sullied.lxiv  To maintain the purity of the bloodline father’s brother’s 
daughter marriage is the favored form throughout the Middle East, since it is as `close to the 
bone' as possible.  Pride in one's paternal blood relatives also means that the recollection of 
patrilineal genealogies has long been a preoccupation among Middle Easterners, and that a major 
art form is the recitation of poetry praising their paternal ancestors. Elite lineages typically brag 
that kinship connections were sought with them, while they, as the noblest clans, did not initiate 
ties with others. This was so even in Medina where, despite the Muslim ideal of religious 
communalism, marriages with the ansar, the local inhabitants of Medina, were rare indeed 
among the early Meccan migrants, who preferred to avoid contaminating their noble qawm (clan) 
with inferior blood.  lxv Even Muhammad's own lineage, the Quraysh, were not immune from 
pride in blood; the Caliph Umar argued that since Muhammad was the most noble of human 
beings, his people, the Quraysh, must be the most noble clan, and "for the rest, it follows 
proximity.  The Arabs were ennobled by the Apostle of God." lxvi  
Ibn Khaldun, the great medieval theorist of Middle Eastern society, described the 
pervasive belief in blood in a way that most Middle Easterners would still concur with today:  
"Everybody's affection for his family and his group is more important (than anything 
else).  Compassion and affection for one's blood relations and relatives exist in human 
nature as something God put into the hearts of men.  It makes for natural support and aid, 
and increases the fear of the enemy.  Those who have no one of their own lineage rarely 
feel affection for their fellows." lxvii   
Of course, as many ethnographers have demonstrated at great length, this is an ideal model that 
is manipulated, extended, or suborned in an infinite number of ways by social actors seeking 
their own advantages.  And as Ibn Khaldun himself says, shared blood does not automatically 
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bring unity; that requires "social intercourse, friendly association, long familiarity, and the 
companionship that results from growing up together, having the same wet nurses, and sharing in 
other circumstances of death and life." lxviii 
But the fact that patriliny is affected by social conditions and personal ambitions does not 
mean that the cultural value of blood is non-existent.  Instead, it serves, according to Max 
Weber's famous metaphor, as a switchman, orienting the direction of social action.  If brothers 
and lineage mates sincerely believe themselves to be indissolubly bound together not just by 
their shifting personal interests, but by an essential biological bond, then they are far more likely 
to stand together as solidary units against enemies.  The postulate of a masculine blood legacy is 
therefore an essential part of what Muhammad Arkoun has called the `cultural imaginary' of the 
Middle East - that is, the historically constructed image of self and other that is characteristic of 
the entire society. lxix   The appearance in Arabia of this blood obsessed segmentary patrilineal 
system (rather than a bilateral system where kinship is traced through both lines, or a hierarchal 
conical clan with elite `elder' lineages) can be understood as a response to the mobile and 
aggressive social environment of the ancient Middle East, where evolutionary competition 
favored the success of groups bound together by their notions of shared substance passed down 
through the paternal line; this segmentary kinship system allowed the formation of groups with 
clear relationships of allegiance and countered tendencies toward diffusion, internal dissension 
and overlapping loyalties that would only be exacerbated by a bilateral kinship system. At the 
same time, it permitted flexibility and adaptation to shifting circumstances in a way that more 
rigid conical clan structures did not.   lxx 
Over the long term, then, faith in a shared blood substance that naturally binds co-equal 
patrilineal relatives inextricably together acts as a stabilizing and constructive model for aligning 
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and motivating social actors in a shifting and perilous environment where any order at all was 
hard to achieve.  Those groups that did accept the belief in blood unity had advantages over those 
who did not, so that the ratification of this concept by Muslim law (which stamped out all traces 
of confusing cross-cutting matrilateral rights) was simply the final step in a long-term historical 
adaptation to a demanding, fluid, and individualistic world in which collectives are fragile and 
under threat. Imagining a `natural' community derived from shared blood lends a symbolic 
physical substance to these groups, offsetting deep centripetal tendencies and providing a 
psychological source for clan solidarity against attackers.   
The hypothesis I have offered of a causal correlation between status instability, an ethic 
of competitive egalitarianism, a cultural idiom of natural difference located in blood inheritance, 
(with its implications of rejection of adoption, extension of inheritance to the children of slaves 
and the denial of alternative marriage forms based on female choice), and the evolution of 
patrilineality into misogynistic patriarchy is tentative and requires more cross-cultural testing. 
But regardless of the causal nexus, it is clear that the Middle Eastern ideology of male blood and 
honor rests upon an obvious and disturbing contradiction: i.e., even though genealogies and the 
official organizational model of the society take account only of men, the incontrovertible fact is 
that the patriline springs from the womb, and that women - outsiders to the patrilineage and 
men's supposed natural inferiors - are the real centers of the segmentary, masculine social 
structure in their role as child-bearers and mothers.   
Of course, the actual centrality of women is recognized in any number of ways within 
Middle Eastern culture. For example, rahm, (the womb) is a common Muslim metaphor for 
spiritual communitas; lxxi it is linked to rahma (mercy), and to Allah in his benevolent aspect of 
al-rahman - the merciful.  Through this imagery, human beings, as children of God, are saved by 
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the compassion of their Creator, like children are held in the embracing arms of their loving 
mother.  Thus, men who have suckled from the same wet nurse are tied together as foster 
brothers. lxxii   Yet this discourse of milk relations and female fecundity is very much subordinate 
and minor; in ordinary speech rather the reference is to patrilineality and nasab (descent).  In 
religion as well, negative images of women have stimulated a counter-discourse among many 
Sufis, where the feminine has been very positively evaluated - God is a bride and enlightenment 
is a process of unveiling.  It was, after all, a female saint, Rabiaya, who first enunciated the Sufi 
faith in divine love.  Sufism also favors `feminine' aspects of religion: emotional intuition, 
ecstatic experience, hidden knowledge, magical practices, and immersion in the encompassing 
womb of God's love (as exemplified especially in the work of al-Arabi). lxxiii  Sufis and other 
unorthodox groups have also been especially welcoming of women's participation and egalitarian 
in their treatment of women - attitudes that have contributed to mistrust of these groups by the 
larger community. lxxiv  
But as Abdella Hammoudi writes, in the predominant Middle Eastern ideology the fact of 
female power is "scandalous according to patriarchal norms and yet impossible to avoid;" its 
tensions force men to struggle continually "to transcend the structural contradiction between a 
patriarchal system and the physical reproduction of lineages." lxxv  This insurmountable tension 
lies at the root of male antagonism toward females in the Middle East, as men seek to suppress, 
degrade and control the women who can so easily disrupt the illusory solidarity of their blood 
relationships. Women in the Middle East are denigrated and held in contempt not because they 
are so weak, but because they are so strong.  
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can be found locally. 
lxiii  The principles of egalitarianism in the faith, combined with Persian sectarianism, did lead some Shi'ite 
extremists, notably the Qarmati, to proclaim that Salman Farisi was actually the proper successor to Muhammad. 
According to the Qarmati, Muhammand was the bearer of outward truth, Ali the bearer of inner truth, but Salman 
was the gateway to knowledge, raised above them both in sanctity. 
lxiv For a modern instance, see Shryock 1997 
lxv  See Watt 1956; Nagel 1982.   
lxvi Quoted in Crone and Cook 1977: 225. 
lxvii Ibn Khaldun 1967: 97.  His theory of the rise and fall of dynasties is based upon the tendency of rulers to 
substitute dependent clients for their co-equal blood kin.  This led inevitably to a deterioration of unity and a loss of 
martial vigor. 
lxviii  Ibn Khaldun 1967: 99, 148. 
lxix See Arkoun 1994. 
lxx  For more detail on this, see Lindholm 1986. 
lxxi See Antoun 1989 for this analysis. 
lxxii For the Arab case, see Altorki 1980 and for Iran, see Khatib-Chahidi 1992  
lxxiii  Al-Arabi cites two women as his major spiritual mentors and uses the union of male and female as the 
metaphor of the completion of the quest for divinity. 
lxxiv The Bekhtashi dervishes treat women as equal members of the brotherhood and radical Kharijite groups of 
early Islam permitted a great degree of female power, including, in one instance, the leadership of women (Dabashi 
1993: 131).  The Qarmati also opposed polygamy, concubinage, the marriage of young girls, and the veil (Ahmed 
1992). 
lxxv Hammoudi 1993: 155, 158. 
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